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Introduction
The indefinite, regular, zero-endpoint, infinite-horizon LQ (IRZILQ) problem is the problem of finding a control function u ∈ U s (x 0 ) for each x 0 ∈ IR n that minimizes the cost functional
with Q = Q T , R > 0, and where the state variable x is the solution ofẋ = Ax + Bu, x(0) = x 0 .
Here the class of control functions U s (x 0 ) is defined by: Willems, 1971 , Molinari, 1977 , or Trentelman & Willems, 1991 . In addition to this class of control functions we also consider the set of linear, internally stabilizing, time-invariant feedback matrices, i.e.
F := {F |A + BF is stable}.
A state feedback control function corresponding to a feedback matrix F and an initial state x 0 is denoted by u F B (x 0 , F ). The following statements are relevant for the IRZILQ problem:
(i) ∀x 0 ∃û ∈ U s (x 0 ) ∀u ∈ U s (x 0 ) J(x 0 ,û) ≤ J(x 0 , u);
(iv) ∆ is positive definite where ∆ denotes the difference between the largest and smallest real symmetric solution of the algebraic Riccati equation (3) below;
(v) The algebraic Riccati equation (3) has a stabilizing solution.
It is immediately clear that (ii) ⇒ (i),(iii). Willems (1971, Theorems 5 and 7) (see also 
The main contribution of the present paper is the converse implication, i.e. (iii) ⇒ (v). In fact this can be formulated as a parametric optimization problem and we will use a matrix differentiation argument to solve it.
If the system is controllable, this result implies that all the statements (i),. . .,(v) are equivalent.
It is well-known from the certainty equivalence principle that the algebraic Riccati equation also appears in LQG optimal control theory. Therefore, it is to be expected that the equivalence result (iii) ⇔ (v) can be translated in a stochastic context. This is done in Section 4. More precisely, in this section we consider a sixth statement in addition to the statements (i),. . . , (v) and show that this statement is also equivalent to statement (v).
We were motivated to study this problem by studying feedback Nash equilibria for infinitehorizon LQ differential games (Başar and Olsder, 1999) . The equivalence (iii) ⇔ (v) leads straightforwardly to a characterization of feedback Nash equilibria in terms of stabilizing solutions of a set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations. In such an equilibrium, the strategy space of each player is restricted to linear time-invariant state feedback matrices, and furthermore, the resulting closed-loop system is required to be stable. A precise discussion is given in Section 5.1. The stochastic interpretation studied in Section 4 is generalized in Section 5.2 to a stochastic differential game setting. In this final section we define the concept of a stochastic variance-independent feedback Nash equilibrium.
Preliminaries
With a small abuse of notation we shall write J(
the unique solution of the Lyapunov equation
The algebraic Riccati equation (ARE) corresponding to our problem is given by 
Main Result
If the stabilizing solution X of the ARE exists, it follows from a standard completion of the squares (see e.g. Willems, 1971 , Lemma 6) that
This expression shows that J is minimized atF for each initial state
x 0 . Of course, if the system is controllable, this fact has already been established by Willems (1971) as noted in the introduction. The next theorem states that the converse statement is also true. Its proof is based on a variational argument. Grabowski considered in (1993) the regular positive definite infinite-horizon LQ problem as a parametric optimization problem.
Working in an infinite dimensional context he showed, under a detectability assumption, that the corresponding ARE has a stabilizing solution using a policy iteration argument. Here we do not assume detectability nor positive definiteness of the state weighting matrix. 
for J for each x 0 ∈ IR n , then X := ϕ(F ) is the stabilizing solution of the ARE.
Proof First note that the set F is a nonempty open set. Secondly note that the smoothness of the coefficients in a Lyapunov equation is preserved by the solution of this equation (see e.g.
Lancaster & Rodman, 1995, Section 5.4), which implies that J is differentiable with respect to F . Now, letF ∈ F be a minimum of J for each x 0 . Then (see e.g. Luenberger, 1969, Section 7.4, Theorem 1) δ 2 J(x 0 ,F ; ∆F ) = 0 for each ∆F and for each x 0 . We have δ 2 J(x 0 ,F ; ∆F ) =
x T 0 δϕ(F ; ∆F )x 0 , which implies that δϕ(F ; ∆F ) = 0 for all increments ∆F . Hence
Next, we introduce the map Φ :
By definition, see (2), we have Φ(F, ϕ(F )) = 0 for all F ∈ F. Taking the derivative of this equality and applying the chain rule yields
Substituting F =F in this equality, and using (4), we obtain ∂ 1 Φ(F , ϕ(F )) = 0, or, equivalently,
The differential of Φ with respect to its first argument with increment ∆F is
Combining this result with (5) produces
which clearly implies that B T ϕ(F ) + RF = 0, or, equivalently,F = −R −1 B T ϕ(F ). Now, since Φ(F , ϕ(F )) = 0, we conclude that X := ϕ(F ) is the stabilizing solution of the ARE.
[] Combining this theorem with the statement preceding the theorem we have the following result. 
Stochastic Interpretation
In addition to the five statements (i),. . .,(v) presented in Section 1, we consider a sixth statement in this section. This statement is related to the infinite-horizon LQG problem with the state available for feedback (see e.g. Anderson & Moore, 1989, Section 8.2). We will show that the sixth statement, which will formally be introduced below, is equivalent to statement (iii) (Lemma 4.2 below). This implies that the existence of the stabilizing solution of the ARE is also necessary and sufficient for the solvability of the IRSILQG problem (introduced below) in the class of linear internally stabilizing state feedback controls.
Let S be the set of all real positive semi-definite n × n-matrices. Consider the following indefinite, regular, full-state-information, infinite-horizon LQG (IRSILQG) problem. Find a feedback matrixF ∈ F which minimizes for each S ∈ S the criterion L : S × F → IR, defined by
with Q = Q T , R > 0, u = F x, and where x is generated by a linear noisy system, i.e.
with a white Gaussian noise w of zero mean and covariance Sδ(t − τ ). The initial state is assumed to be a Gaussian random variable independent of w. Our setting differs from the setup of Anderson & Moore (1989) in that we do not assume Q to be positive semi-definite and furthermore, we require the solution to be independent of the covariance matrix S. Indefinite We call the IRSILQG problem solvable if:
We show that (iii) ⇔ (vi) (Lemma 4.2). Using the result of the previous section this implies that (vi) ⇔ (v) (Corollary 4.3) . The implication (v) ⇔ (vi) is well-known for a positive semi-definite Q, but is usually proved in a different way. We first need the following lemma. 
For each i = 1, . . . , n we have J(y i ,F ) ≤ J(y i , F ). Hence
(⇐) ChooseF as the feedback matrix corresponding to statement (vi). Let x 0 ∈ IR n and F ∈ F.
Define the matrix S := x 0 x T 0 . Clearly, we have S ∈ S, which implies that L(S,F ) ≤ L(S, F ).
Hence, using (8) 
An Application to LQ Differential Games
In this section we use the equivalence results from the two preceding sections to characterize feedback Nash equilibria in infinite-horizon LQ differential games both in a deterministic and a stochastic context.
The following notation will be used. For an N-tupleF = (F 1 , . . . ,F N ) ∈ Γ 1 × · · · × Γ N for given
The Deterministic Case
Consider the cost function of player i defined by
with u j = F j x for j = 1, . . . , N, and where x is generated bẏ
This last assumption spoils the rectangular structure of the strategy spaces, i.e. choices of feedback matrices cannot be made independently. However, such a restriction is motivated by the fact that closed-loop stability is usually a common objective.
In our setting the concept of a feedback Nash equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 5.1 An N-tupleF = (F 1 , . . . ,F N ) ∈ F N is called a feedback Nash equilibrium if for all i the following inequality holds:
for each x 0 and for each state feedback matrix α such thatF −i (α) ∈ F N .
Next, consider the set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations (see also Başar and Olsder, 1999, Proposition 6.8) :
A stabilizing solution of (10) is an N-tuple (X 1 , . . . , X N ) of real symmetric n × n matrices
In contrast to the stabilizing solution of (3), stabilizing solutions of (10) are not necessarily unique (see e.g. Weeren et al. (1999) ). The next theorem states that feedback Nash equilibria are completely characterized by stabilizing solutions of (10). Its proof follows straightforwardly from Corollary 3.2.
Theorem 5.2 Let (X 1 , . . . , X N ) be a stabilizing solution of (10) and define
is a feedback Nash equilibrium, there exists a stabilizing solution (X 1 , . . . , X N ) of (10) such that
The restriction that feedback matrices belong to the set F N is essential. Indeed, there exist feedback Nash equilibria in which a player can improve unilaterally by choosing a feedback matrix for which the closed-loop system is unstable (Mageirou, 1976 ).
The Stochastic Case
Now consider
with u j = F j x for j = 1, . . . , N, and where x is generated by a linear noisy system, i.e.
with w, x 0 as defined in (7) and Q i , R ii as defined in the previous section. The information structure of the players is assumed to be a perfect state feedback pattern. Next, introduce Definition 5.3 An N-tupleF = (F 1 , . . . ,F N ) ∈ F N is called a stochastic variance-independent feedback Nash equilibrium if for all i the following inequality holds:
for each S ∈ S and for each state feedback matrix α such thatF −i (α) ∈ F N .
Then, the following theorem, which follows straightforwardly from Corollary 4.3, characterizes all stochastic variance-independent feedback Nash equilibria.
Theorem 5.4 Let (X 1 , . . . , X N ) be a stabilizing solution of (10) and define F i := −R −1 ii B T i X i for i = 1, . . . , N. Then (F 1 , . . . , F N ) is a stochastic variance-independent feedback Nash equilibrium. Conversely, if (F 1 , . . . , F N ) is a stochastic variance-independent feedback Nash equilibrium, there exists a stabilizing solution (X 1 , . . . , X N ) of (10) such that
We conclude that for a given parameter set (A, B i , Q i , R ij ) the set of stochastic varianceindependent feedback Nash equilibria coincides with the set of feedback Nash equilibria corresponding to the deterministic case.
Concluding Remarks
We have shown that the existence of a stabilizing solution of the ARE is a necessary and sufficient condition for the unique solvability of the IRZILQ problem in the class of linear state feedback controls. Furthermore, we have also shown that this unique solution coincides with the unique solution of the IRSILQG problem in the class of linear state feedback controls. The equivalence results have been generalized to a differential game setting in both a deterministic and stochastic context, with a perfect state feedback information pattern for the players.
